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Modernity – that phase of societal history from the discovery of 
science (let’s say, the discovery of the telescope) to the detonation of 
the Hiroshima bomb – is characterised by the overarching belief in 
one final and universal truth, be it about science, religion or human 
behaviour. In contrast, postmodernity defies this notion, and describes 
the current phase of human societal development as fundamentally 
complex, truth as something provisional and contextual, and ethics 
as something to be created in the quagmire of vibrant human 
interaction.[1] This echoes a haunting note spanning more than two 
millennia – the Socratic injunction to constantly re-examine societal 
truth claims in the light of newer developments. With these thoughts 
in mind, I take a fresh and provocative look at the accepted paradigm 
of informed consent in clinical and research settings.
The informed consent paradigm
In the normal run of human affairs, and particularly in matters medical, 
whatever we do to others should be governed by their freely given 
and informed consent. This has both legal and ethical foundations. 
Legally, we may face criminal or civil litigation on grounds of assault 
or crimen injuria if we so much as touch a patient without her consent.[2] 
Patient consent is based on what a patient knows and understands 
about the given medical situation/proposed treatment/envisaged 
research. In litigation against doctors, it is often contended that 
information provided was inadequate in that complications had not 
been disclosed; only rarely is frank negligence argued (it might also be 
more difficult to prove). There are numerous laws and guidelines that 
address both the mandatory nature and extent of informed consent 
in clinical and research practice, such as the SA Bill of Rights[3] and the 
National Health Act No 61 of 2003,[4] to name but two in South Africa 
(SA). The ethical foundation to informed consent is that by gaining it, 
we show our respect for others as moral agents, and promote their 
personal autonomy – the ultimate aim of informed consent.[2] The 
autonomy argument goes as follows: the information/knowledge 
asymmetry between the two parties implies a corresponding power 
differential, promoting paternalism and coercion, and problematising 
free choice. The way to correct this is to provide or supply information 
to the patient, which (theoretically) eliminates the power differential, 
thereby empowering the patient to rationally deliberate and make free 
and informed decisions. This is the essence of the so-called informed 
consent paradigm (ICP). A consequence not generally appreciated is 
that the doctor/researcher-patient/parti cipant interaction assumes 
characteristics of a contractual agreement, and its moral content 
consequently diminishes (the only moral aspect of a contract or 
agreement once it has been agreed to is the responsibility that it be 
honoured).[5]
But there are many problems inherent in this notion, and the 
demands made upon us in order to justify an authentic consent 
process are onerous. In this short reflection I aim to focus on one 
problematic issue only: the nature of and the transfer of information. 
My arguments are loosely based on a provocative book by Manson 
and O’Neill,[6] although others have voiced similar concerns.
The container-conduit metaphor: The 
process of informing
The metaphors we generally use when talking (and thinking) about 
information and the process of informing describe our general 
conceptions of the matter. We conceive of information as content 
passing from one person to another like contents flowing passively 
via a conduit from one vessel to another (the container-conduit 
metaphor).[6] Other metaphors we commonly use (some are italicised 
above to show just how pervasive their usage is) support this notion, 
implying that we conceive of information as contents – tangible, 
contained or containable, packaged or like data on a memory stick/
hard drive and by implication as readily and passively transferable. 
Grady[7] illuminates the container metaphor for communication: our 
ideas (objects) are put into words (containers) and sent (via conduits 
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like our voices) to listeners who extract the ideas/objects out of 
the words/containers. In this explication, extracting information is 
an active, creative process. The essence of my argument is that the 
ideas packaged by medical practitioners in the informed consent 
communication and delivered verbally are most likely vastly dissimilar 
from those extracted, understood and eventually internalised by the 
patient – upon which she eventually decides.
The container-conduit metaphor was originally presented by Reddy 
in 1979,[8] and served as inspiration for Lakoff and Johnson,[9] who laid 
down the principles for the current theory of conceptual metaphors. 
Human linguistic communication is well-nigh inconceivable without 
the use of metaphors, the usage of which is essential and so 
pervasive as to pass unnoticed unless specifically studied. Conceptual 
metaphors are not the passive linguistic adornments we often 
conceive them to be, but cognitive speech-acts; metaphors reveal 
not only what, but also how we think about matters, and also how 
knowledge discloses itself to us.[10,11] So, in conceiving of information 
as ideas readily packageable into words, easily transferred to patients 
and as easily and clearly extracted and understood by them, we 
reveal our belief that the process of informing is passive and simple, 
as simple as pouring content from one container to another, or 
transferring digitally stored data, or, well, simply telling someone.
Informing is an active, not passive process
But what then is the nature of ‘informing’ (Manson and O’Neill 
use the word information as a verb), and how does the patient/
research participant make sense of the words she hears (i.e. extract 
information and turn it into knowledge)? The original meaning of the 
verb ‘to inform’ (to shape, like a sculptor) illustrates the multifaceted, 
complex and active process that informing really is, starting with 
sense-making.[11] But first, ideas have to be extracted from their word 
packages, and the ability to do this depends on individual linguistic 
ability and familiarity with the subject matter. Limitations in these 
respects are bound to lead to difficulties in reconstructing the original 
ideas as understood by the informant. But let us accept that there is 
sufficient understanding by the patient to extract the gist of the ideas 
originally packaged by the medical professional (normally not an 
expert in the art/science of communication). The next step is to make 
sense of these ideas. Subjective issues now come into play. Disease 
has changed the circumstantial and emotional environment of the 
patient, resulting in experiential discontinuity. Each individual patient 
has previous individual experience or knowledge that provides a 
unique matrix in which any new information is organised and laid 
down. There is selective retention of newly compounded experience 
for immediate or future use and sense is made through enactment – a 
sort of data-interpretation-action (Moore, W. Unpublished PhD, 2010, 
Stellenbosch University). The process is unique and contextual within 
each patient’s own frame of reference, cognitive ability and past 
experience, culture and understanding through language proficiency. 
Remaining gaps in the existing knowledge matrix are plugged with 
new knowledge, which is created or transformed from implicit, 
explicit (provided) and cultural knowledge. Therefore, knowledge so 
newly created and internalised is likely to differ considerably from that 
understood by the doctor, and the same information imparted in the 
same way to different patients is likely to be interpreted differently. 
Add to this that no two doctors would package the same ideas in the 
same words, or deliver them in the same way.
The eventual aim of becoming informed is rational deliberation in 
the face of existing choices. A prerequisite to rational deliberation is 
being informed: having a clear understanding of all relevant facts and 
opinions expressed by the doctor, in the absence of which the notion 
of informed consent is doomed.
The process referred to above not only takes place within the mind 
of a person with a particular frame of reference and acculturalisation, 
but is influenced by emotions and other extraneous influences 
(e.g. the opinions and emotions of family members). It is a journey 
or process rather than an instantaneous act. Thus meaning is 
individually, contextually and actively created.
Prerequisites for the ICP
The prerequisites for the ICP to succeed in both clinical and 
research informed consent are that informing must be both fully 
comprehensive and explicit, which Manson and O’Neill[6] argue 
it can never be. If these two conditions are not met, it follows that 
the information requirement fails; thus the notion that we promote 
autonomy by empowering patients/participants through informing 
them and diminishing the information-based power differential also 
fails (at least, partially) simply because we are not really informing 
them, at least not comprehensively and explicitly.
Not all clinical medical acts of informing  are so complex as to 
justify this concern. If, for example, an abscess requires drainage, the 
nature of the subject matter, ready reference to visible pathology and 
relatively simple surgery imply an uncomplicated informed consent 
process (consent for the anaesthetic is sought separately and might 
be more complex). However, imagine a common occurrence in the 
SA public health system: informed consent has to be obtained but 
neither of the parties is fluent in the other’s home language and the 
patient may need to undergo a complex procedure such as trans-
arterial cannulisation and cryo-ablation of an aberrant intra-cardiac 
conduction path that causes ventricular tachy-arrythmias or irritable 
focus that initiates atrial fibrillation. How does one understandably 
package in words the information you need to transfer, and how 
is this information eventually recreated by the recipient? How 
authentic is autonomy-based informed consent? Secondly, in 
medical, particularly clinical drug-related research, the process and 
nature of informing can be very complex (drug study informed 
consent documents are extremely complex and may be more than 
20 typewritten pages in length; even research ethics committee 
(institutional review board (IRB)) members may struggle to fully 
understand these complexities) and the concerns raised above are 
fully justifiable. Again, we may question the authenticity of eventual 
informed consent. For this reason Moore (Moore, W. Unpublished 
PhD, 2010, Stellenbosch University) has argued that there is space for 
a dedicated information therapist/ethics consultant to facilitate the 
process of informed consent. On top of this, informed consent in the 
clinical situation should be contextually (i.e. subjectively) tuned to 
the patient’s frame of reference and level of understanding, in a way 
justifying diminished informing.[4]
Alternatives to the ICP
However, informing patients and obtaining their uncoerced prior, so-
called informed consent, flawed as it might be, remains an undeniable 
moral and institutionalised legal requirement. So if the ICP fails, what 
alternatives do we have? There are several possibilities:
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Revert to paternalism
Respectfulness of human life and respect for humans are fundamental 
philosophical and legal tenets and non-negotiable practice guidelines 
(think for example of the Kantian dictum to treat others always so 
that their own interests are also served[12], or the South African Bill of 
Rights[3] and the National Health Act[4]). If paternalism implies exerting 
control over others, it is therefore not an option. One could argue for 
a benign form of paternalism (in the original meaning of the word, as 
a father would care for his children), but this may be as problematic 
as arguing for the notion of benign dictatorship. Besides, ‘prejudging 
that the sick are not fully autonomous is biased’ and unsubstantiated, 
and for most practitioners, technical expertise ‘does not include the 
ethical qualifications and prerogative to decide for others’.[13]
Retain the illusion of autonomy
I argue that we effectively and unwittingly often practise some limited 
degree of autonomy combined with some degree of paternalism 
(flawed but ‘good-enough’ or ‘minimalist’ informed consent). This 
is unsatisfactory and poses several questions, for example, how 
reflective should choices be? How do we define acceptable informed 
consent? Why should limited autonomy be honoured and override 
other important principles?[6] Manson and O’Neill[6] call this minimal 
autonomy intended to secure a form of rational autonomy. But to 
call choices made on this basis reflective may justify too much (when 
patients elect dangerous choices) or too little (when dealing with 
complex interventions). Furthermore, if autonomy is equal to mere 
choice, equal protection for irrational choices is mandatory. Vice (Vice 
S. Unpublished paper and personal communication: March 2004. 
Used with consent) has argued that autonomy for its own sake is void 
of any ethical purpose (for her, respecting autonomy and autonomous 
choice should serve a purpose – instantiating the ‘good life’ according 
to individual dictates). If comprehensive and explicit informing 
is impossible, it implies that we accept that many patients de facto 
have limited competence, and should either be denied treatment or 
treated with paternalism.
De-link the information and consent components 
of informed consent
This defensive mode of practising entails informing as well as possible, 
realising its limitations and obtaining consent for legal purposes, with 
limited emphasis on truly autonomous choice. Similarly, we may 
also de-link the moral and legal aspects of informed consent while 
emphasising moral obligations and sincerely attempting to treat 
others as a moral agents even if this is not fully autonomous informed 
consent. The legal requirement for informed consent is again met as a 
defensive practice strategy (to prevent litigation or complaints to the 
Health Professions Council of South Africa).
Evaluate alternative models of informed morally 
acceptable doctor patient relationships
I discuss only two:
An ethics of responsibility
This notion expresses, perhaps a bit more coherently, the essence 
of the third options above, and may be developed from the work of 
Jonas[14] and Bauman.[5] Jonas emphasises the responsibility humans 
have for others, responsibility that spans time and space, and Bauman 
describes the moral nature of this responsibility. Recognition of 
need in others and an ability to respond appropriately to that need 
and consequent action legitimate one as a moral agent, and are the 
foundations of morality. This responsibility is awesome in scope and 
content. It is not limited, and not based on nor demands reciprocity. 
Without assuming that such an onerous notion is appropriate to 
medical practice, any serious attempt at this form of practice would 
ensure prime care and prime attention to ethical responsibility, 
and would be incompatible with practices that do not take patient 
interests and consent seriously, but would not necessarily be as 
onerous as the ICP. 
Informed consent as a transaction
 Informed consent as a transaction can be defined as ‘a communicative 
action or activity involving two parties or things that reciprocally 
affect or influence each other’.[6] This notion is unique in recognising 
that informing can never be comprehensively explicit and specific. 
Consequent consent would therefore not satisfy the arduous 
demands of the paradigm model, or fundamentally promote 
autonomy. Instead of promoting paternalism, we de facto rely on 
a (limited and contextual) waiver of the legal and ethical claims 
attendant to treatment without so-called fully informed consent.[6] The 
scope of the waiver is determined by the scope and nature of the 
legal/ethical norms that need to be waived in order to treat (i.e. the 
scope and nature of treatment). The notion emphasises the type 
of communicative action that the process of informing should be: 
reciprocal flow between two moral agents. It legitimises relative 
instead of absolute explicit/specific informing. But there are certain 
protective norms inherent to effective communication, for example 
comprehensibility, relevance and accuracy, and these are the 
foundations of this type of interaction.[6] In the final instance certain 
undertakings are made – contextually about treatment/research. This 
notion also responds to several characteristics of communication 
obscured by the container-conduit metaphor. Communication is 
context- and norm-dependant, propositional, a rational action (and 
therefore rationally evaluable), allows agents to be aware of the 
bigger picture and assists them in making a wide range of inferences, 
depending on personal circumstances and frames of reference. But 
fundamental to this notion is accepting that the dictates of the ICP 
are simply impracticable.
Quo vadis? Four practical suggestions
So what does this mean in our daily practice? I’ll restrict myself to four 
concluding suggestions:
Bauman’s[5] notion of responsibility is probably too onerous for 
general medical practice (although, perhaps, it is not for the research 
environment, owing to its peculiar dynamics). There have nevertheless 
been suggestions that an ethics of responsibility might be the only 
coherent approach to bioethics, given the unusual inherent moral 
demands. This ethic ‘ruthlessly demands justification and responsibility 
for our moral actions even if not moulded in conventional moral 
argumentation’.[15] It demands that we accept unconditional and non-
reciprocal responsibility, and be empowered with the tools of moral 
debate.[16] This ethic is no lame excuse for paternalism, which develops 
from a totally different mind-set. As Jonas puts it: the ultimate ‘purpose’ 
is the ‘ever-transcendent possibility’ of human dignity.[14] There can be 
no better aim in medicine.
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Seeing the informed consent process as a communicative action 
emphasises our moral responsibilities and the continued importance 
of values such as the trust placed in medical caregivers: that even if I 
can’t know/understand everything, even if I am anaesthetised or on a 
ventilator, I can rely on the integrity of my doctor, and may be assured 
that my best interests will always predominate. This should apply to 
the research situation as well; in fact, more so, since research may hold 
risks absent from clinical settings, is not essential to the wellbeing 
of the patient and may hold little if any advantage for individual 
participants.
A solid debate of the theory v. the practicalities of informed 
consent along the lines argued before seems appropriate, although 
we will only make progress if we admit the incoherence of the current 
paradigm, and convince others – lawyers, lawmakers, theoretical 
ethicists – of our argument. Manson and O’Neill[6] argue that what 
we do in practice probably corresponds more with their views than 
with current laws and guidelines. Furthermore, those responsible for 
formulating laws and guidelines concerning the practice of informed 
consent should tone down their increasingly onerous demands.
We should take the suggestion of empowering ourselves with the 
tools of moral debate seriously. Medical (clinical) ethics has to do with 
daily patient-directed doctor-patient relational/therapeutic issues 
and decisions, including informed consent, and the practitioner 
should be confident in making these decisions. These often apply to 
clinical research as well. Appropriate ethics courses and continued 
professional development events with more ethics and less medico-
legal material may further serve to empower clinicians.
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